Louisiana’s current general rule for wrongful-death claims compares two periods: one year from death and two years from the day injury or damage is sustained. The longer period controls. That is different from giving every family two years after a death.
The distinction comes from Act 176 of 2025, effective August 1, 2025. The act amended both the wrongful-death and survival articles, but preserved separate medical-malpractice rules. A reliable deadline analysis therefore begins with the kind of claim, the injury and death dates, and the version of the law that applies. The legislature’s HB 291 history records the act and its effective date.
Two claims can arise from one death
A survival action preserves the injured person’s claim for losses sustained before death. A wrongful-death action addresses qualifying beneficiaries’ own losses caused by the death. Medical expenses and pain experienced before death belong to a different analysis from a family’s loss of support or relationship.
The Louisiana Supreme Court explained this distinction in Walls v. American Optical Corp., No. 98-CC-0455. That decision concerned the application of a workers’ compensation immunity amendment to a later-arising wrongful-death claim. It is useful for understanding why the claims are independent. It did not interpret Act 176, which was enacted decades later.
The people entitled to bring each claim must also be identified. Article 2315.2(A) gives priority to a surviving spouse and children, followed by parents, siblings, and grandparents when the preceding classes are absent. Adoption and abandonment provisions require separate attention. Article 2315.1(B) also provides a role for the succession representative in a survival action when no listed beneficiary exists. Opening a succession does not, by itself, extend a claim’s deadline.
How the law changed between 2024 and 2025
Two enactments are easy to confuse. Act 423 of 2024 changed Louisiana’s general delictual prescription rules. Act 176 of 2025 later changed the specific wrongful-death and survival provisions.
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| Instrument | What the operative text did | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Act 423 of 2024 | Established a general two-year delictual period and repealed former articles 3492 and 3493. Effective July 1, 2024, with prospective application to delictual actions arising after that date. | It did not itself amend articles 2315.1 and 2315.2. |
| HB 291, engrossed version | Proposed replacing one year after death with two years after death in both articles. | This proposal is not the formula ultimately enacted. |
| HB 291, reengrossed version | Introduced the longer-of comparison and separate medical-malpractice provisions. | The medical-malpractice wrongful-death provision still changed before enactment. |
| Act 176 of 2025 | Enacted the longer-of comparison. Medical-malpractice survival actions refer to R.S. 9:5628; medical-malpractice wrongful-death actions receive a specific one-year-from-death rule. | The enacted article text, read with later amendments and applicable case law, supplies the starting point. |
There is a particular source of confusion in the enrolled act. Its introductory description still refers to two years from death, while the operative amendments use one year from death or two years from injury or damage, whichever is longer. Reading only that introductory description, an early bill version, or a short headline can produce the wrong answer. The current articles reproduce the longer-of language.
The Louisiana Law Review’s April 2025 discussion identified the mismatch left by the 2024 change and discussed several possible solutions, including a longer-of formula. Act 176 was a subsequent development. The essay should be understood in its publication-date context.
Three examples of the statutory comparison
These hypothetical dates illustrate the formula for ordinary claims governed by the amended articles. They assume the injury date is established and no other rule changes the calculation. They are anniversary comparisons, not instructions to wait until a particular filing day; court holidays, filing procedure, interruption, suspension, and claim-specific issues still require review.
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| Injury and death | One year after death | Two years after injury | Later anniversary |
|---|---|---|---|
| Injury and death March 1, 2026 | March 1, 2027 | March 1, 2028 | March 1, 2028 |
| Injury March 1, 2026; death April 1, 2026 | April 1, 2027 | March 1, 2028 | March 1, 2028 |
| Injury March 1, 2026; death September 1, 2027 | September 1, 2028 | March 1, 2028 | September 1, 2028 |
The second example shows why adding two years to the death date can overstate the period. The third shows why looking only at the injury anniversary can understate it. Survival and wrongful-death claims should still be analyzed independently, even when their ordinary statutory comparisons produce the same date.
Medical malpractice follows separate rules
Article 2315.2(F) states a one-year-from-death period for medical-malpractice wrongful-death actions. Article 2315.1(F) directs medical-malpractice survival claims to R.S. 9:5628. That statute contains a one-year period from the alleged act, omission, or neglect, or discovery, together with its stated three-year outer limit.
The medical review panel process can affect the time for suit. R.S. 40:1231.8(A) specifies suspension rules, filing requirements, and consequences of failing to satisfy fee or waiver requirements. An informal complaint, a request for medical records, and a properly filed panel request are different things. The ordinary examples above should not be used to calendar a malpractice claim.
An older event needs a transition analysis
Act 176’s effective date does not establish that every earlier claim receives extra time. The enacted instrument contains no express revival clause. Whether a particular claim was still viable, when each cause of action arose, what law previously governed, and whether prescription was interrupted or suspended all need examination.
Do not combine Act 423’s express prospective provision with Act 176 as though they were one law. Likewise, do not treat Walls as an automatic answer to the application of a different amendment. It explains the significance of separate causes of action, while a transition dispute requires analysis of the actual amendment and facts.
A death involving federal defendants, maritime activity, medical treatment, or other special circumstances may implicate additional deadlines or procedures. The longer-of formula is a starting point for claims within its scope, not a universal deadline for every death occurring in Louisiana.
What to bring to a deadline review
Keep a dated sequence of the incident, first symptoms or injury, treatment, death, any earlier suit or panel filing, and any dismissal. Preserve the actual filed documents and service records, not just a recollection that a claim was opened. Include family relationships and any adoption or succession documents relevant to the proper plaintiffs.
Our explanation of survival and wrongful-death claims addresses the different losses. The guide to filing a Louisiana wrongful-death lawsuit addresses the broader process. Having a lawyer assess the earliest plausible deadline promptly avoids relying on a calculation that leaves out a controlling fact.
Our Baton Rouge wrongful-death practice reviews the claims, proper plaintiffs, and deadlines together.
Research date: October 16, 2026. Examples are hypothetical and address only the stated assumptions.
Related Louisiana guidance. The filing deadline is separate from the question of which defendants may be named. Our direct-action case timeline addresses suits against insurers. Our Louisiana wrongful-death and survival guide explains the two claims more broadly. Browse the full Louisiana Legal Research collection for additional topics.