Louisiana Insurance Bad Faith Law: What Act 932 Changed


Louisiana Act 932 changes the defenses available to an insurer facing certain bodily-injury bad-faith claims. Its most difficult provision combines the absence of a settlement offer with an insurer having time to respond. The official digest describes that condition differently from the enacted text. That difference matters when deciding how to make an offer and whether a later bad-faith claim exists.

The change is in R.S. 22:1892(I)(3). The official bill history records that Act 932 became law without the governor’s signature on June 23, 2026, effective August 1, 2026. This article focuses on the bodily-injury provision; the Act also addresses contractor verification and other insurance-claim provisions.

Read the enacted Act alongside the statutory page

When checked for this update, the legislature’s consolidated page for R.S. 22:1892 still displayed the earlier paragraph (I)(3). Use the enacted Act 932 to identify the amendment. An official website can contain a current enactment and a consolidation that has not yet caught up.

The new paragraph concerns a cause of action created by Subsection I against an insurer, brought by its insured or the insured’s assignee, in a personal-injury or bodily-injury claim. It lists three conditions under which that subsection does not create the cause of action: a good-faith liability dispute, a good-faith medical-causation dispute, or the offer-and-response condition discussed below. The former restriction on a separate claim against an insurer’s representative is now paragraph (I)(4).

That scope is significant. A defense to this statutory claim does not by itself resolve whether insurance coverage exists, whether the insured caused an injury, or whether the insurer owes money under a different provision. Each asserted remedy needs its own legal basis.

The offer clause contains an unresolved wording problem

Subpart (c) describes an offer within the applicable limits not having been presented by or for a third-party claimant, followed by “and the insurer has been given at least thirty days to respond.” Read literally, those conditions join an absent offer with an afforded response period.

The official résumé digest instead describes an absent offer together with the insurer not having been afforded 30 days. Neither formulation should be silently rewritten as two independent bars: no offer or insufficient time. Those are different propositions.

R.S. 24:177 makes enacted text the best evidence of legislative intent and says a digest is not part of the law or proof of legislative intent. The digest therefore cannot simply repair the sentence. Courts may have to decide how the words operate together and in the context of the rest of the statute.

The practical recommendation here is to make a clear offer within applicable limits and give a meaningful opportunity to respond while preserving arguments about the text. That reduces an avoidable factual dispute over the opportunity to settle. It is not a conclusion that the legislature unambiguously enacted a universal 30-day demand requirement, or that a demand satisfying that recommendation guarantees a viable claim.

The illustration summarizes the author’s practical reading. Its statement that a limits offer is essential is a cautious recommendation, not a reported court holding resolving subpart (c). The statutory wording and separate defenses are discussed in the text.

What Act 932 changed

La. R.S. 22:1892(I)(3) | Effective August 1, 2026

Before Act 932

Failure-to-settle analysis

  • No firm offer was always required
  • Liability was one factor among several
  • Insurer had an affirmative duty to act
  • Totality included exposure, limits, investigation, and communications

Kelly + Smith totality framework

ACT 932

After Act 932

Any one may bar the Subsection I claim:

  1. Good-faith liability dispute

  2. Good-faith medical causation dispute

  3. No within-limits offer plus at least 30 days to respond

    Enacted grammar is internally awkward

PRACTICAL EFFECT

A clear limits offer is now essential, but it is not enough by itself.

The demand record must also eliminate objectively reasonable liability and medical-causation disputes.

Legal analysis reviewed Sept. 21, 2026

The liability and medical-causation defenses need separate attention

Subparts (a) and (b) do not share subpart (c)’s wording problem. They identify good-faith disputes about liability and medical causation as separate conditions. Sending an offer and allowing time does not resolve either defense.

A carrier’s assertion that it has a dispute does not explain why the dispute is in good faith. On the other hand, a later adverse verdict does not establish that an earlier position lacked a reasonable basis. The useful record shows what information the insurer had, when it had that information, what it investigated, and why it maintained or changed its position.

For example, a witness who initially supports the insured’s account may later correct it after seeing video. A causation question may change when earlier medical records become available. Preserve the original explanation, the new evidence, proof of delivery, and the insurer’s response. Those facts let counsel evaluate a developing claim without assuming that the initial assessment remained justified indefinitely.

Disputed issue Useful material Limit to address
Which driver caused the collision Original video, witness observations, scene measurements, vehicle evidence A report’s conclusion may not reveal the underlying evidence or conflicting accounts.
Whether the collision caused a particular injury Earlier and later medical records, symptom history, reasoned provider opinions Timing alone does not establish medical causation; prior conditions need an honest assessment.
Whether the insurer had a realistic settlement opportunity The complete offer, attachments, delivery confirmation, release terms, replies An amount within limits can still leave essential terms or available coverage unclear.
Whether an earlier dispute remained supportable Dated supplemental evidence, requests for explanation, changed assessments A later development must be tied to the information actually available at the relevant time.

Our article on evidence in a disputed-fault crash explains how to organize competing accounts around the specific fact in dispute.

What the older failure-to-settle cases still explain

In Kelly v. State Farm, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that an insurer could face a bad-faith failure-to-settle claim under former R.S. 22:1973(A) even without receiving a firm settlement offer. Its analysis rested on the insurer’s duties to its insured and evaluated the circumstances of the settlement opportunity.

Kelly also discussed factors from Smith v. Audubon, including liability, damages, coverage, investigation, communications, and the parties’ exposure. It rejected using ambiguous demands and unrealistic deadlines to manufacture an excess-liability claim. Those lessons remain useful for documenting the file, but Kelly did not interpret Act 932. Its no-firm-offer holding cannot be presented as a settled answer to the new paragraph.

The relationship between statutory and contractual duties also requires care. Calling a claim “breach of contract” does not establish that it survives a statutory defense. Counsel must identify the obligation, the conduct said to breach it, available damages, and the effect of the amended law. Act 932 should not be described as either eliminating all bad-faith remedies or leaving every older theory untouched.

Identify whose claim is being asserted

An injured third-party claimant, the policyholder being defended, and an assignee of the policyholder’s rights occupy different positions. Paragraph (I)(3) expressly addresses the insured or assignee. A person injured by an insured driver should not assume that this wording gives the injured person a direct, general claim for unfair handling.

In Troung v. Sanders, the Supreme Court addressed the limits on third-party claims under former R.S. 22:1973. It distinguished the insurer’s general duties to its insured from the particular statutory acts a third party could invoke. The Court also rejected penalties on the facts before it despite ruling against the insurer on the underlying property-payment issue. Losing a coverage or payment argument and acting in bad faith are separate questions. Troung predates Act 932.

An assignment likewise needs scrutiny. Determine who owns the right, what the assignment transfers, and what defenses and limitations apply. A settlement, covenant, or excess judgment should not be assumed to establish either the assignment’s enforceability or the insurer’s liability. Preserve the insured’s interests when structuring any agreement.

UM/UIM presents another difficult application. The injured person may be asserting rights under their own uninsured- or underinsured-motorist policy, while subpart (c) refers to an offer by a third-party claimant. Subparts (a) and (b), the other provisions governing payment, and the policy may raise distinct issues. Do not assume the liability-carrier demand process supplies the complete rule for a UM claim.

Files spanning August 1 require a dated chronology

Act 932 contains no express retroactivity instruction. That leaves questions about the classification of the amendment and when the particular right or claim arose. The accident date matters, but it should not be treated as the sole answer for every insurance bad-faith theory.

Sher v. Lafayette Insurance explains Louisiana’s inquiry into legislative expression and whether an amendment is substantive, procedural, or interpretive. There, an increase in penalties and a new right to attorney fees were substantive and did not apply retroactively. Calling legislation remedial did not settle the question. Sher supplies an analytical framework, not a holding about Act 932.

Smith v. Citadel Insurance concerned an insured’s failure-to-settle claim under earlier law. The majority tied accrual in that case to an executory excess judgment after the insured’s suspensive-appeal period expired. Justice Weimer’s concurrence considered that accrual discussion unnecessary to resolve the case. Neither opinion establishes that every present-day bad-faith claim accrues only after an excess judgment.

Build the chronology around the loss, notice, proof supplied, settlement opportunities, alleged misconduct, judgment, and relevant appeal dates. Separate conduct before August 1 from later conduct. A continuing claim file is not necessarily a single continuing breach for retroactivity purposes. The applicable filing period also needs separate analysis by remedy and statutory version; do not borrow a limitation period from an older opinion without checking intervening legislation.

Make the settlement opportunity understandable

A useful demand tells the recipient exactly what acceptance would accomplish. Identify the claimant, insured parties to be released, claims included, amount sought, and applicable coverage. Address known liens, reimbursement interests, competing claimants, other insurance layers, and any required approval. If limits are uncertain, request the policy information and explain how the offer is framed; do not assume an uncertain amount is within limits.

Attach the evidence necessary to evaluate the disputed issues. Explain significant gaps rather than burying them. Ask the insurer to identify missing information or unclear terms promptly, and respond reasonably to those requests. Keep the complete package actually transmitted, including its attachments and delivery record.

The existing illustration below recommends 35 to 45 days after confirmed receipt as a conservative working allowance. That range is a practice recommendation, not language enacted by Act 932. The appropriate response period and any extension depend on the file. A demand deadline also does not suspend the deadline for filing suit.

The suggested 35 to 45 days is a conservative planning range, not a statutory deadline. An offer does not by itself establish bad faith or defeat a good-faith liability or medical-causation defense.

The conservative Act 932 demand workflow

Build a record that answers liability, causation, limits, timing, and receipt.

  1. Build proof

    • Liability facts
    • Causation proof
    • Prior records
    • Damage floor
    • All policies
    • Client authority

    REMOVE DISPUTES

  2. Define offer

    • Exact amount
    • Named insureds
    • Release attached
    • Claims reserved
    • Writing required to accept

    CAPABLE OF ACCEPTANCE

  3. Prove receipt

    • Adjuster
    • Supervisor
    • Claims portal
    • Defense counsel
    • Every layer
    • Receipt date

    SAVE EVERY RECEIPT

  4. Allow time

    • 35 to 45 days after receipt
    • Exact date
    • Central Time
    • Invite questions
    • Consider extension

    NO TIMING GAMES

  5. Preserve result

    • Acceptance
    • Counteroffer
    • Specific dispute
    • Silence
    • Expiration
    • Renewal

    FREEZE THE RECORD

FOUR AVOIDABLE FAILURES

  • Unknown or misstated limits
  • Ambiguous release terms
  • Withheld material proof
  • Short exploding deadline

A compliant offer removes only one potential bar. The plaintiff still must prove breach, causation, and recoverable damage.

Legal analysis reviewed Sept. 21, 2026

Specify the acceptance method, recipient, date, time, and time zone. Leave enough time to resolve foreseeable questions about releases or approval. An offer involving a minor or someone acting through a representative requires particular attention to authority and any required court process. Do not promise that a release can be delivered on terms the claimant cannot perform.

Several Civil Code provisions matter when drafting the actual terms. Article 1928 addresses an offer that specifies an acceptance period; article 1943 addresses a nonconforming acceptance; and article 3072 requires a compromise in writing or recited in open court in a form capable of transcription. These rules warrant attention before sending the offer, especially when the proposed acceptance and later release could differ.

After a response or expiration, preserve what happened without overstating its legal effect. If material evidence changes, consider a renewed opportunity to settle. Keep the underlying injury case, the insured’s exposure, and the possible insurance claim on separate calendars. Our settlement-process article explains the distinction between negotiating a claim, agreeing to release terms, and receiving payment.

Prepare for the actual defense the insurer raises

In a contested case, organize the record around the particular subsection and alleged breach. Request the basis for the liability or causation position, the information considered, the dates of evaluation, and communications about settlement opportunities. Compare those records with the evidence supplied and the insured’s exposure.

Claim-file material is not automatically all discoverable. Attorney-client privilege, work-product protection, relevance, and the procedural posture can limit production. Counsel should assess objections and available discovery methods rather than assuming every internal assessment must be disclosed. Similarly, pleading an alternative contractual theory requires a supported legal and factual basis.

The floor amendment raises a separate constitutional question

The introduced HB 1162 concerned contractor-license verification before certain property-repair payments. The Senate floor amendment added the bodily-injury bad-faith provisions. That sequence raises a question under Louisiana Constitution article III, section 15(C), which requires amendments to be germane to the bill as introduced.

The change in subject matter does not itself establish a constitutional violation. In Jones v. Board of Ethics, the Supreme Court upheld an amendment where the original and amended bills furthered a common statutory policy, despite substantial differences in their specific subjects. The dissent took a narrower view. A challenge to Act 932 would have to address that majority analysis and the relationship between the original claims-payment provisions and the later amendment. No ruling invalidating Act 932 is asserted here.

For a current file, the immediate work is factual: identify the governing claim, clarify the settlement terms, supply the available proof, document receipt and responses, and protect filing deadlines. A Louisiana personal injury lawyer can evaluate how those facts interact with the new language and any available insurance remedies.

Research limits: Public-source searches for this update did not locate a Louisiana appellate decision construing new paragraph (I)(3). That search is not a substitute for current case research in a pending matter. The interpretations and practice recommendations above identify unresolved issues rather than reporting a court’s resolution of them.